Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine quickly transcended the boundaries of inter-state conflict, becoming nothing short of a global confrontation between Western democracies and authoritarian states aligned with Moscow. After decades of declared neutrality and ostentatious pacifism, the European Union has now realized that not only is the fate of Ukraine itself at stake but also European security more generally.

Europe’s push to rebuild its military capabilities has resulted in, among other things, increased spending on the space sector. This has included intelligence, awareness, and satellite telecommunications (SatCom) capabilities. Fortunately, European aerospace startups have been able to provide to policymakers finding themselves bewildered in an era of dramatic geopolitical upheaval. Europe’s example has been followed by several other countries, including South Korea, Japan, Israel, and Canada.

Below, we will analyze how global interest in the militarization of space has been growing in recent years and what the global security sector aims to achieve in this sphere.

A European alternative to Starlink

Ukraine’s experience during the war has clearly demonstrated how crucial high-speed satellite communications are on the battlefield. Starlink terminals have played an important role in defeating Russian attacks, coordinating troops, and organizing at the command level.

Unfortunately, the benefits that Ukraine derived from Starlink have also had a downside, since reliance on the system puts Kyiv at the mercy of the personal whims of Elon Musk, who has repeatedly interfered in Starlink operations to the benefit of Russia. Musk initially forbade the Ukrainian military to use Starlink to control attack drones, in one case infamously blocking its use in a planned attack against Russian naval forces in Crimea. In other instances, problems with Starlink connectivity at the front have been reported, especially during critical moments of the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive. Moreover, Starlink terminals began to appear among Russian units 2023-2024, despite Starlink repeatedly denying that it has provided any equipment to Russia.

This kind of unpredictability has understandably alarmed European policymakers. Recognizing the catastrophic risks of delaying the development of independent capabilities, they quickly began developing their own SatCom resources, both civilian and military. Furthermore, such resources would be useful if the United States enters into a period of crisis, potentially causing European allies to lose direct access to American satellite systems.

Currently, the main alternative to the American Starlink system is the European IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity, and Security by Satellite) system. In May 2023, several heavyweights in the European aerospace industry, including Airbus, Eutelsat, Hispasat, SES, and Thales Alenia Space, banded together to form the joint SpaceRise consortium, the goal of which was the design and subsequent creation of a satellite communications constellation. The industry has signaled that it is ready to begin development and that it expects a green light from European officials in the form of budget allocations, agreements, and contracts.

By the beginning of January 2024, the EU had already expressed its intention to conclude contracts worth billions of euros to develop the new satellite constellation. Mirroring the Starlink system, this deployment would include hundreds of spacecraft in low and medium Earth orbits (LEO and MEO).

This is not the first time the EU has made moves in this direction, however. The clearest example is the earlier Galileo geospatial awareness and navigation system, which is analogous to the American Global Positioning System (GPS). Able to draw on experience gleaned from the Galileo project, the main question facing IRIS² was the allocation of sufficient funds. On March 27, 2024, the European Space Agency took the first step in this direction, agreeing to allocate €900 million to finance the project. However, before the development process could be started it became necessary to study the potential profitability of the system. Unfortunately for the European security sector, such financial questions have become the project’s Achilles heel.

Implementation of the project is also likely to be affected by a lack of unity of vision among its main beneficiaries in Europe. In April 2024, for example, the Vice Chancellor of Germany, Robert Habek, wrote an open letter to the EU leadership in which he emphasized the high cost of IRIS² and criticized what he regarded as the unfair distribution of the financial burden between the main countries involved in its construction, namely France and Germany. Habek questioned the viability of rapidly putting the system into orbit and insisted that it was necessary to “rethink” the project’s budget.

Ultimately, it is likely that red tape will cause serious delays in the development of IRIS², which will, in turn, impose serious costs on European security. These costs, unfortunately, will not just be financial.

Satellite reconnaissance: SAR and optical-electronic surveillance satellites 

Although Germany has persistently demonstrated a desire to save money on IRIS², it should be noted that the country already has its own satellite intelligence resources. At the end of December 2023, SpaceX’s Falcon 9 launched two military satellites for the Bundeswehr: the SARah (synthetic aperture radar) system, which was designed in cooperation with Airbus Defense and Space. With SARah, Germany plans to gradually replace its previous generation SAR-Lupe reconnaissance probes, which have been in operation since 2007.

Falcon 9 carrying SARah satellites, December 28, 2023
Falcon 9 carrying SARah satellites, December 28, 2023.
Credit: SpaceX

SAR satellites are designed for electronic reconnaissance and, today, serve as the primary alternative to optical-electronic systems, given SAR’s significantly expanded surveillance capabilities. The main advantage of such devices is that they can conduct reconnaissance at night, as well as in cloudy conditions when visual observation of targets is impossible. 

One example of the successful use of SAR technology during active hostilities is the Finnish ICEYE, which leases the intelligence resources of its satellites to the Ukrainian military. These agreements were concluded by the end of August 2022, when the company signed a one-year contract with the Serhiy Prytula Charitable Fund (through the direct mediation of Max Polyakov) to rent one SAR satellite outright and to have access to satellite observation data from the entire ICEYE constellation. 

One year later, the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense summarized the results of this cooperation. Several images taken with the help of ICEYE satellites have been published, indicating the position of S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft units, together with an RLS-92N6 mobile multifunctional radar, on the outskirts of Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. Other images depicted the Dyagilevo airfield in Ryazan Oblast, an important base for the deployment of Tu-22M3 and Tu-95MS strategic bombers that regularly attack Ukraine.

ICEYE image: Dyagilevo airfield, Ryazan Oblast
ICEYE image depicting Dyagilevo airfield, Ryazan Oblast.
Source: gur.gov.ua
ICEYE image: S-300 & S-400 anti-aircraft units and RLS-92N6
ICEYE image depicting S-300 & S-400 anti-aircraft units and RLS-92N6 radar system.
Source: gur.gov.ua

HUR officials added that the satellite surveillance data received from ICEYE was used to plan the strike on Sevastopol on September 13, 2023, which managed to destroy a Russian landing ship and a submarine carrying “Kalibr” ballistic missiles.

The growing popularity of ICEYE is also reflected in the level of investment it attracts. During the latest funding round held in April 2024, the Finnish company managed to secure $93 million in investments, bringing its total capitalization to $438 million, a very interesting result for the European space market.

Ukraine’s effective use of intelligence satellites has made other European states, especially those that share a border with Ukraine, begin to reconsider the importance of having such resources at their disposal. At the end of February 2024, for example, Poland concluded a contract worth $2.5 billion to procure Northrop Grumman’s Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) by the end of 2031.

IBCS creates a multi-level operational control system, which, among other things, integrates data received from military satellites and is intended to be used to strengthen anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense capabilities. The system only entered service in the United States in 2023, but it has already attracted considerable interest from close allies, especially in the NATO bloc.

IBCS measures aimed at countering enemy aircraft and missiles
IBCS combines various measures aimed at countering enemy aircraft and missiles.
Source: Northrop Grumman

According to Cezary Tomczyk, Poland’s Deputy Minister of Defense, Warsaw plans to put its first military satellites into orbit in 2025. According to Tomczyk, the new satellites will consist of both domestic and foreign equipment and will focus on “radar observation irrespective of atmospheric conditions,” an unequivocal sign that SAR satellites will be deployed. 

Most likely, the military satellites in question will be produced under contract with Airbus, with an agreement between Warsaw and the company having been concluded in January 2023. However, these satellites were only scheduled to be delivered in 2027. Russia’s war against Ukraine has thus either necessitated adjustments to the delivery time or Tomczyk’s statement referred to a different contract. In either case, Poland typifies the trend of growing defense budgets in both Eastern and Western Europe. Today, Ukraine’s closest neighbor spends more than 4% of its GDP on the military, which is significantly higher than the 2% mandated by NATO membership.

Joint anti-space warfare exercises

Along with the need for communications and intelligence satellites, there is also a pressing need to train allied forces to effectively protect their space assets and repel potential attacks.

During one exercise, dubbed AsterX 2024, the US military conducted a wargame at France’s National Center for Space Studies (CNES) in Toulouse. During this exercise, the US-led “Red Team” carried out a simulated attack using a Mercury satellite equipped with a robotic manipulator arm, against a Celtica communications satellite belonging to “Team Blue,” led by France. The Celtica satellite was supposed to escape proximity with the enemy and execute an evasive maneuver to transition to a safer orbital trajectory.

This exercise constituted just one part of AsterX 2024. The exercises, which cost half a million euros, focused on running various simulations. Nearly 4,000 virtual spacecraft were simulated, operating in multiple orbits. The simulation then reproduced 23 events that closely resembled scenarios space force operators might encounter during a confrontation in orbit.

Commercial partners were also involved in these events, including experts from ArianeGroup and the French aerospace lab ONERA (Office national d’études et de recherches aérospatiales), which is one of France’s largest research centers in the fields of space, aeronautics, and defense. By analyzing the results of the simulations, they were able to draw conclusions about specific improvements the military is seeking in the sphere of space technology. This sort of collaboration will ultimately have a direct impact on new doctrines and technological developments.

In addition to France and the United States, 14 other partner countries also took part in this year’s AsterX training, including Germany, Japan, Canada, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, South Korea, and others. The Commander-in-Chief of the French Space Command (CdE), General Philippe Adam, emphasized the importance of such exercises, particularly for enhancing the professionalism of space system operators. The general also noted the close approximation of the wargames to real space warfare conditions, given that NATO’s main strategic rivals, China and Russia, already have unmanned spacecraft equipped with robotic manipulators in their arsenal. These can approach and capture allied satellites, depriving ground forces of key advantages like intelligence and high-speed communication.

AsterX 2024 wargames
AsterX 2024 wargames.
Source: Marjolijn van Deelen, Special Envoy for Space, EU via X

France remains the leader among EU countries in the number of active satellites it operates. By the end of 2023, there were 91 French satellites in orbit, and the country continues to increase its military space funding. By 2030, Paris plans to spend about €6 billion on its military space forces. Among other things, this will include a demonstration launch of “Yoda” small satellites, which will be equipped with offensive lasers that can blind enemy satellites or missiles equipped with optical guidance sensors.

France, of course, is not the only country that is serious about developing its own militarized space sector. Other global space powers also continue to increase their defense spending in this field as well. For example, at the UK’s Space-Comm Expo, Paul Godfrey, the Commander-in-Chief of the United Kingdom Space Command (UKSC), stated that his department will allocate an additional $8.23 billion to strengthening the country’s space defense capabilities. By comparison, the US Space Force had a budget of $30 billion in 2024. Such a significant sum allocated to UK space defense is thus a sign of significant commitment to this sphere by the British government. 

USSF funding - a proportion of the American defense budget
Although the total sums are quite large, USSF funding of $30 billion remains only a small proportion of the American defense budget.
Source: US Department of Defense (DOD)

It should be noted that the military is not only preparing for a direct military confrontation in orbit. The UK’s newly created National Space Operations Centre (NSpOC), for example, will focus on solving the problems of space debris and space traffic in an increasingly crowded orbital environment.

The value of experience and cooperation “against the odds”

The use of space resources to support direct participation in military conflicts is becoming increasingly common. The most illustrative example of this is South Korea, which to this day remains in a de jure state of war with its northern neighbor, communist North Korea. This situation keeps the South Korean defense sector active, making the country one of the world’s largest developers and suppliers of military equipment.

In early December 2023, South Korea confirmed the launch of its first military surveillance satellite, which was launched on November 30 on a Falcon 9 rocket from Vandenberg Space Force Base. The launch was a response to the appearance of a North Korean spy satellite placed into orbit earlier in 2023. At the same time, South Korea is taking increasingly aggressive steps to rid itself of dependence on SpaceX for orbital launches. It has already used a domestic launch vehicle, KSLV II (“Nuri”), on several missions. 

It remains to be seen how North Korea will construct, launch, and maintain its satellites while no longer depending on third-party intermediaries. In any case, the country plans to deploy four more military satellites by the end of 2025.

The confrontation between the two Koreas intensified with the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Today, calls are increasingly being heard on both sides of the 38th parallel to prepare for an inevitable war. One possible trigger for this conflict could be armed aggression by China against Taiwan.

Elsewhere, Israel has used both American and domestic satellite intelligence resources to plan its military operations. This experience was likely crucial to a recent agreement concluded between Morocco and Israel to construct a military satellite for Rabat, which has had intermittent border conflicts with neighboring Algeria since the 1960s. 

A $500 million contract was signed between Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and the Moroccan government in December 2023. The parties agreed to jointly build a new satellite to replace Morocco’s aging “Mohammed VI-B” system. Despite the geopolitical sensitivities involved, this agreement represents an example of “cooperation against the odds” that demonstrates a simple rule: matters of national security and lucrative military contracts  trump other considerations.

Canada too is increasing funding for its space sector. Ottawa was one of the founders of the “Five Eyes” (FVEY) intelligence network, which originally included Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and is now joined by Germany, France, and Japan.

Together with the United States, Canada also founded the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which tracks spacecraft and detects missile threats. Starting in June 2022, Canada began allocating an additional $36.6 billion for the modernization of these systems, which will be implemented gradually over the next 20 years. In addition, Ottawa is investing in the development of a constellation of three Radarsat satellites. At the end of last year, the Canadian government promised to allocate $740 million for this purpose, which will also involve the development and launching of a fourth Radarsat system.

Previously intended for monitoring atmospheric phenomena, climate changes, and the location of man-made disasters, Canadian Radarsat satellites can be used for military applications as well.

Radarsat capabilities
Radarsat capabilities.
Source: researchgate.net

Deterrence in space is becoming a more and more urgent issue, which has prompted the countries of the free world to unite to keep the initiative in the growing confrontation with their main strategic rivals: the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. The emergence of new military commands, specialized structural units that deal purely with space security and deterrence, and the steady increase in funding only confirm this trend. At the same time, however, we should not ignore the strengthening, in certain circumstances, of global cooperation in the military space sphere, which has been expressed both in joint exercises and in the conclusion of new contracts for the construction of space infrastructure and equipment.