Forced Independence: How Europe Can Replace America’s Military-Space Capabilities

The political turbulence and questions about the durability of old alliances triggered by President Trump’s new administration have reached the Old World. Europe is now preparing for the possibility of a restructuring of NATO, which may be the result of increasingly isolationist policies and a shift in U.S. focus toward the Asia-Pacific region. If this happens, it will usher in a new reality in which Europe’s space sector is left to stand on its own. To soften the consequences of such a painful separation, EU countries, together with the United Kingdom, are already planning a restructuring of their space sector, including its military component. But will Europe be able to fully replace the military-space capabilities of the United States?

The main components of NATO’s military-space potential

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has played a key role in building the military-space capabilities of its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was established in 1949 to counter the spread of Soviet influence. Eastern Europe, meanwhile, became Soviet puppets and joined the Warsaw Pact, founded in 1955. This marked the outlines of a new world order, whose ideological competition led to the Cold War.

Since the main threat in the postwar era was ballistic missiles, space technologies immediately became a primary area of interest for both alliances. Satellite reconnaissance systems, satellite communications, positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), and missile defense all grew increasingly important. By the end of the 20th century, with the rise of the computer era, cybersecurity became part of this framework, followed later by a full-fledged Space Force component, established in the U.S. in 2019. Since the beginning of the space age, the United States has played a leading role in developing all the key space components for the global defense of NATO’s European sector.

Satellite Intelligence: The Eyes of Modern War 

Today, the United States provides NATO member countries with full access to the capabilities of its spy satellites. This allows Europeans to obtain comprehensive information about troop movements, deployment locations, command centers, weapons depots, and military infrastructure facilities. Until recently, the role of space-based reconnaissance was largely assigned to government satellites developed for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Europe has also developed similar reconnaissance satellites, but in significantly smaller numbers.

Currently, the European Space Agency (ESA) has a rather limited pool of active monitoring satellites that can be used for military intelligence. These are primarily part of the Copernicus program: specifically, two Sentinel-1 satellites providing radar images of Earth’s surface, and two Sentinel-2 satellites focused on optical imaging. In total, 13 monitoring satellites are currently in orbit under the Copernicus program, though some have very specialized functions. For instance, the two Sentinel-5 satellites are designed to study atmospheric conditions and monitor greenhouse gas emissions, while the Sentinel-6 pair exclusively tracks the state of seas and oceans. Therefore, in terms of satellite reconnaissance, Europe cannot rely heavily on ESA observation systems. A more viable alternative lies in the resources of private space companies offering satellite monitoring services on demand.

The latest U.S. military space strategy, which also largely shapes American involvement in NATO, calls for integrating both national and commercial monitoring spacecraft into the reconnaissance process. Such commercial entities are invited to perform intelligence tasks upon request from the U.S. Department of Defense and NATO. For example, on August 19, 2024, satellite company Planet Labs announced a contract with NATO involving 20 of its SkySat monitoring satellites for military reconnaissance purposes. Planet Labs operates under NATO’s Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) program, launched in 2023.

The APSS program proposes to integrate surveillance resources from both state and commercial satellites to establish a resilient military space intelligence system. It currently includes 17 NATO member countries, and the total five-year budget amounts to $1 billion, making it one of NATO’s largest investments in satellite reconnaissance.

The Planet satellite constellation is also not the only commercial participant involved in APSS. It is likely that other monitoring companies, including Maxar Technologies, Spire Global, and others, are also part of the program. However, this remains speculative, as information about commercial players in APSS is restricted due to security concerns, and not every private participant publicizes their involvement as openly as Planet Labs does. Nonetheless, it is a fact that most commercial companies involved in the program are U.S.-based. This means they fall under American jurisdiction and are subject to the whims of American legislation, which can unilaterally prohibit their participation in international security programs, including APSS.

As for the European segment of commercial satellite monitoring companies, particular mention should be made of France’s Airbus Defence and Space, Italy’s Telespazio, Germany’s OHB SE, Finland’s ICEYE, and the UK’s Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL) and Inmarsat. In theory, all of them could be utilized for military reconnaissance purposes under the APSS program or future alternatives.

In the effort to establish a new approach to space-based intelligence using commercial satellite fleets, data processing plays a crucial role, alongside image capture. For instance, the aforementioned American company, Planet Labs, announced in July 2024 the signing of a seven-figure pilot agreement with an international client from the Department of Defense. The deal involves the post-processing of PlanetScope satellite observation data, with acquired satellite images to be enhanced using artificial intelligence (AI) systems, specifically Theia, developed by the American company SynMax.

Europe also has several private companies offering services for enhancing satellite imagery and processing big data, particularly through AI-based geospatial models. In addition to the previously mentioned Airbus Defence and Space and Telespazio, the Italian company Planetek Italia specializes in post-processing satellite imagery. The Swiss company Sarmap also provides satellite image processing services using AI models and primarily works with radar data (provided by SAR satellites). The processed data from Sarmap is useful for civilian tasks, including land use monitoring, flood tracking, and similar applications. The Czech company EOfactory, which focuses on analyzing satellite data to support agricultural activities, incorporates AI-based geospatial models into the image processing workflow.

Such operators’ services usually do not relate to military data processing, but rather to geodetic surface analysis used by major developers in designing new types of logistics infrastructure or smart construction projects, agricultural management, and so on. But would these companies refuse to cooperate with the military if the EU offered them truly favorable terms and developed step-by-step initiatives to unlock their intelligence potential?

Satellite navigation: is there a replacement for GPS? 

In addition to surveillance and reconnaissance, satellites serve as a key element in positioning, navigation, and timing systems, which can provide geospatial data for guiding precision cruise and ballistic missiles, long-range UAVs, military aircraft, and coordinating armored vehicles and infantry units. The most widely used navigation system currently employed by NATO forces also has American origins. The Global Positioning System, or GPS, had its first combat test in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf. Since then, GPS has been an integral part of all military navigation and weapons guidance systems used by NATO.

Interestingly, it was the United States that acted as the main initiator of creating a European GPS counterpart in 1999. At the end of the 20th century, Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom began developing the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which was named Galileo. At the time, even the most ardent pessimists didn’t foresee a possible U.S. withdrawal from NATO, and the new European satellite navigation system was intended to strengthen the resilience of PNT systems within NATO and serve as an additional layer of satellite navigation in case something happened to the American satellites. However, with an uncertain future for the North Atlantic alliance, Galileo is becoming an increasingly important tool in the hands of European NATO member states.

Comparatively speaking, both GNSS systems are quite similar. Both are located in medium Earth orbit (MEO), ranging from 20,200 km for GPS to 23,616 km for Galileo. The full Galileo constellation consists of 27 active satellites positioned across three orbital planes. GPS, for its part, operates 31 satellites. However, since the American GNSS was originally designed with military operations in mind, its satellites are distributed across six orbital planes. This greater number of orbital planes provides significantly better coverage angles of the Earth’s surface, even in challenging natural terrain conditions.

However, the smaller number of orbital planes in Galileo also has its advantages. Chief among them are the lower deployment costs and better optimization of satellite navigation in densely built-up urban areas. It is precisely in large cities where Galileo offers significantly greater positioning accuracy than GPS. The European GNSS is also more resistant to interference, as it uses more advanced types of satellite signal encryption and operates on different frequencies. Galileo provides a range of authorized services for government officials and public institutions with enhanced connection security.

But today, the main advantage for Europe lies in the fact that Galileo is not controlled by the U.S. Department of Defense, offering a fully independent PNT system that can be used for both civilian activities and military operations. It’s also important to understand that, within NATO, the American and European GNSS were intended to be used in combination to improve the overall resilience of the Alliance’s satellite navigation. Without access to the American GPS, European NATO countries would not be left entirely geospatially blind, but they would have a significantly weaker capability than if both PNT systems are integrated into the structure of navigation and military command.

Satellite communications: Waiting for IRIS² and the first attempts to replace Starlink

Another critically important function of satellites in the NATO context lies in the organization of encrypted military communications, which are indispensable at every stage of modern warfare, from conducting tactical military operations to coordinating global strategic communications at the brigade or army corps level.

For years, two American military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) systems, Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS), have served as key components for NATO military coordination, data exchange between command centers, and communications with military bases. Each system has its own specialized role:

• Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) is a constellation of six satellites in geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) responsible for secure and jamming-resistant communication, the transmission of classified information, and the establishment of strategic communications channels.
• Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) is a constellation of 11 GEO satellites responsible for wideband communications, enabling the transfer of large volumes of data, including command communications as well as intelligence and surveillance data.

Some individual NATO countries in Europe also possess their own national-level MILSATCOM analogues. France, for example, operates a constellation of two satellites: Syracuse 4A and 4B. The UK has its own MILSATCOM system, though it consists of just one communications satellite, Skynet 6A. Germany (with two geostationary SatcomBW satellites) and Italy (with three Sicral satellites) also have their own MILSATCOM systems for data exchange and encrypted strategic command. However, these fragmented national satellites in geosynchronous orbit are not capable of delivering an optimized level of secure military communication across the EU as a whole.

In June 2016, the European Union began to recognize the need for its own secure, reliable, and cost-effective satellite communication system for governmental and military users. This led to the emergence of the EU GOVSATCOM concept: a pan-European program that proposed pooling the resources of both public and commercial European satellite systems to make better use of existing capabilities. The EU GOVSATCOM initiative aimed to use a standardized system of ground-based hubs to integrate the capacities of different satellite operators, enabling emergency communication channels for crisis management as well as secure governmental and military links. As such, EU GOVSATCOM became part of the EU Space Programme for 2021–2027, with final implementation currently in progress.

However, it is important to understand that this is not a full-fledged satellite system with its own dedicated constellation and infrastructure. Instead, it is focused solely on optimizing existing satellite communication capabilities and can be seen more as a set of support mechanisms—albeit highly effective ones—designed to compensate for the lack of a unified satellite communications system within the EU.

Given all the challenges posed by the absence of a comprehensive European satellite communication system, the EU has, since 2023, been developing a new satellite system: IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite). It is planned for use in secure governmental and military communications. IRIS² is scheduled to launch in 2027, and by the end of 2030, the full constellation of 290 satellites should be in orbit. Several European satellite companies, including Eutelsat, Hispasat, and SES, have already signed contracts to develop the satellites. The total value of these contracts is €10.6 billion.

IRIS² is designed as a multi-orbit constellation, meaning its satellites will operate across several orbital altitudes: low Earth orbit (LEO), geostationary orbit (GEO), and medium Earth orbit (MEO). This setup will enable a layered architecture of satellite communications: the lower layer (LEO) will handle real-time communication and internet connectivity, the GEO satellites will expand broadband coverage and serve as relay stations, and the MEO satellites will provide global scalability for IRIS² in the future.

Another important resource for satellite communications, particularly for military use, is the capacity offered by commercial satellite companies. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the American Starlink internet satellite constellation by SpaceX has played a key role in enabling Ukraine to resist Russian aggression. Satellite signal terminals have been installed across nearly every section of the Ukrainian front line, proving crucial for maintaining stable communication between military units, controlling reconnaissance and combat drones, coordinating armored and infantry units, and battlefield command and control.

At present, it must be acknowledged that Europe has no commercial satellite constellations equivalent to Starlink in terms of capability. Still, proposals to create something similar to SpaceX’s internet service have occasionally emerged. For example, French satellite operator Eutelsat has suggested replacing Starlink terminals in Ukraine with its own satellites. The goal was to reduce the Trump administration’s leverage over Ukraine regarding the initiation of peace talks. Eutelsat recently announced plans to provide Ukraine with about 40,000 satellite terminals to replace an equivalent number of Starlink terminals. These announcements have already led to a nearly fourfold increase in Eutelsat’s stock during the first week of March 2025.

But are the two systems really comparable?

After acquiring British satellite operator OneWeb, France’s Eutelsat became the owner of a constellation of 630 LEO satellites and 35 GEO relay stations, which ensure rapid inter-satellite data exchange. By comparison, Starlink currently has ten times more LEO satellites (7,000) and Elon Musk’s company plans to expand that number to 42,000 by around 2030. The newer Starlink satellites also offer slightly higher connection speeds: 200 Mbps compared to the 150 Mbps currently offered by Eutelsat. Nevertheless, within the European region, the capabilities of Eutelsat’s satellite constellation are sufficient to establish secure satellite connections along the entire Ukrainian front.

It’s worth noting that it will still take years before IRIS² becomes fully operational across Europe. Commercial companies also cannot fully compete with American global satellite communication networks. On the other hand, Russia currently lacks any adequate commercial analog to Starlink. It only has its national satellite communication system, Meridian, which is already in active status.

Anti-missile defense: SBIRS, Aegis, and THAAD

The “nuclear umbrella” that the United States deployed over European NATO countries resulted in a situation wherein EU countries simply did not need to develop their own comprehensive ballistic missile warning and countermeasure systems: all of these systems were already employed by the U.S. and fully covered Europe’s missile defense needs. As a result, the EU relied on the capabilities of the American two-component missile warning system, SBIRS (Space-Based Infrared System), which began development in the 1990s when the U.S. decided to replace its old missile warning system, DSP (Defense Support Program).

The SBIRS system was designed to track ballistic missile launches using satellite constellations at various orbital altitudes. These satellites can detect the heat signature of missile launches through sensitive infrared sensors. This allows for the detection of missile launches at the initial stage of ballistic launch, providing enough time to calculate the potential flight trajectory of the missile and to engage countermeasure and interception systems. Later, the functionality of SBIRS was upgraded, adding new sensors aimed at detecting and tracking maneuverable hypersonic missiles. This led to the development of the HBTSS (Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor) concept, a new U.S. satellite sensor for tracking the flight path of hypersonic missiles.

The latest missile defense program, Next-Gen OPIR (Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared), is set to further expand the capabilities of the U.S. early missile warning system with a new generation of missile-warning satellites, such as NGP (Next Generation Polar) and NGG (Next Generation Geosynchronous), which will be positioned on polar and geosynchronous orbits, respectively. The first NGG missile warning satellite was launched into orbit in 2022, and the NGP launches are scheduled to begin in 2026.

It is important to understand that all the systems mentioned above only signal a missile threat and are not able to counter ballistic and hypersonic missiles. For interception and neutralization, NATO uses other types of systems of American origin:

• Aegis and Aegis Ashore — for intercepting medium- and short-range ballistic missiles. These are implemented both as ground-based missile defense batteries and on NATO naval ships. Currently, the main Aegis Ashore systems are deployed in Poland and Romania.
• MIM-104 Patriot — the primary missile defense system of NATO countries, in service with the Alliance since the 1980s. It is designed to intercept all types of missile threats: ballistic, cruise, and even hypersonic missiles (it was the American Patriot systems provided to Ukraine in 2023 that first intercepted Russia’s new hypersonic “Kinzhal” missiles). Patriot batteries are deployed in many EU countries, such as Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, and Germany. Germany also has its own equivalents of Patriot — the IRIS-T missile system, developed by Diehl Defence. However, the profiles of these systems differ somewhat: while the Patriot is mostly aimed at intercepting ballistic missiles, IRIS-T is more effective against medium-range cruise missiles.
• THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) — a relatively new system for intercepting ballistic missiles in their final flight phase. These American systems are not yet deployed in mainland Europe.

Given that nearly all of NATO’s missile defense/air defense systems are of American origin, in August 2022, Germany proposed the creation of a fully European system: the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI). ESSI’s main goal is to improve the interoperability of various national missile defense systems, ensure independence in European missile defense matters, and reduce the costs of maintenance and procurement of such systems. As of 2025, 24 European countries have joined the ESSI initiative: Austria, Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, United Kingdom, Turkey, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland.

ESSI aims not so much to create European equivalents of American missile defense systems from scratch, but rather to procure and integrate existing systems into a comprehensive and standardized European missile defense system. The future ESSI will primarily consist of the following missile defense systems:

• Short-range: Skyranger 30, produced by German Rheinmetall Air Defence AG.
• Medium-range: IRIS-T SLM.
• Long-range: Patriot.
• Intercontinental (exoatmospheric) range: Israeli system IAI Arrow 3.

German-made radar systems are proposed for targeting and detecting missile threats: Hensoldt TRML-4D (for IRIS-T), EL/M-2080 Green Pine (for IAI Arrow 3), and Raytheon LTAMDS (for Patriot).

Currently, the pan-European ESSI system is still in the deployment phase, as the integration of various missile defense systems into a unified structure initially requires addressing many technical nuances related to data exchange, coordination of actions, and fire control. Most likely, elements of the European Sky Shield will be implemented gradually as certain stages of their integration are completed.

As we can see, however, it was only the full-scale phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war that forced European states to recognize the need for the development of their own pan-European missile defense system.

Time to rearm? 

The issue of an immediate start of a large-scale pan-European rearmament campaign is being raised more frequently by European leaders. The realization that, in this new world, the EU can no longer fully rely on the military potential of the United States, along with the growing threat from Russia, has become a key factor in the emergence of such discussions.

In early March 2025, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, presented a new plan to modernize and strengthen the EU’s military capabilities, which proposes spending €800 billion on this process. This money is also intended to strengthen the military-space potential of a united Europe by the end of the current decade. The plan proposes involving a wide range of commercial companies in cooperation with the defense sector, following the example of the United States. Part of this €800 billion will be spent on strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities.

The Trump administration continues to put forward its concepts of NATO’s future, in which American protection and access to the U.S. military-cosmic potential will be guaranteed only to those NATO member countries that spend enough on their defense. A figure of 5% of a country’s GDP has been mentioned, and some NATO countries (such as Poland) are coming close to this level. However, the very idea of selective allied assistance from the U.S. is increasingly prompting European politicians to consider implementing their own defense systems, similar to American ones.

One must also not forget the most important deterrent factor that Europe could lose if the U.S. decides to completely reduce its presence in Europe: the American “nuclear umbrella,” which has served as the main guarantee of protection for European countries since the end of World War II.

Key European countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have their own nuclear weapons, but their numbers are measured in only a few hundred nuclear warheads per country (515 in total). Germany has a certain number of nuclear warheads (around 20 B61 warheads are stored at the Büchel airbase), but these are American weapons, not directly owned by Berlin. In comparison, the nuclear arsenal of Russia, the main threat to the EU, is ten times larger, with several thousand nuclear warheads (around 5,580, according to preliminary data).

Recently, French President Emmanuel Macron made a statement regarding France’s readiness to extend its “nuclear umbrella” to other EU countries, thereby providing them with the necessary security guarantees in case the U.S. decides to completely withdraw its military presence in Europe. However, until this happens, the EU is urgently beginning to strengthen its own military-cosmic forces. It is already clear that this delay will cost the EU dearly and present several technical challenges. Forced independence has awakened European officials from their comfortable and secure slumber. But it’s better to wake up late than never.